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Military personnel are deployed abroad for missions ranging from humanitarian relief efforts to combat actions; delay or
interruption in these activities due to disease transmission can cause operational disruptions, significant economic loss, and stressed
or exceededmilitarymedical resources. Deployed troops function in environments favorable to the rapid and efficient transmission
of many viruses particularly when levels of protection are suboptimal. When immunity among deployed military populations is
low, the risk of vaccine-preventable disease outbreaks increases, impacting troop readiness and achievement of mission objectives.
However, targeted vaccination and the optimization of preexisting immunity among deployed populations can decrease the threat
of outbreaks among deployed troops. Here we describe methods for the computational modeling of disease transmission to explore
how preexisting immunity compares with vaccination at the time of deployment as a means of preventing outbreaks and protecting
troops and mission objectives during extended military deployment actions.These methods are illustrated with five modeling case
studies for separate diseases common inmany parts of the world, to show different approaches required in varying epidemiological
settings.
1. Introduction
Military personnel are deployed abroad for missions ranging
from humanitarian relief efforts to combat actions. While
deployed, troops have very specific goals and objectives to
achieve within the time frame of their individual deployment
rotations, and delay or interruption in these activities due
to reasons such as illness and disease transmission can
cause operational disruptions, significant economic loss, and
stressed or exceeded military medical resources.
Deployed troops function in environments favorable
to the rapid and efficient transmission of many viruses—
resulting from infection by disease-carrying forces and local
populations, high-risk behavior, and inadequate medical care
[1]—particularly when levels of protection are suboptimal. It
has been shown that, historically, deployed forces have expe-
rienced higher rates of hospital admission from infectious
diseases than frombattlefield combat and noncombat injuries
[1] combined.
When immunity among deployed military populations
is low, the risk of vaccine-preventable disease outbreaks
increases. This increased risk in turn has an impact on troop
readiness and achievement of mission objectives. However,
the threat of outbreaks can decrease through public health
interventions, particularly targeted vaccination, and the opti-
mization of preexisting immunity among the deployed pop-
ulation. High seroprevalence to vaccine-preventable disease
and the corresponding protective threshold have the possi-
bility of providing protection against outbreaks to deployed
troops.
Here we explore, through the use of computational mod-
els of disease transmission, how preexisting immunity com-
pares with vaccination at the time of deployment as a means
of preventing outbreaks and protecting troops and mission
objectives during extended military deployment actions.
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2. Methods: Computational Models
On average, deployed military forces consist mainly of
healthy, physically-fit individuals ranging in age from 18 to
45 years. Soldiers enter and leave the deployed population via
inward and outbound rotation rates and casualty rates, which
may vary throughout the duration of the military action.
Within military populations there is a distinct structure in
which social mixing can be largely within-unit, with a lower
level of between-unit contacts occurring in common areas.
The deployment tasks of the individual units can vary dra-
matically, as can their level of contact with local populations.
In regions where viruses are circulating at endemic levels,
this local contact can significantly affect transmission rates
to troops.
Depending on the mission at hand, inward-rotating sol-
diers are often vaccinated against common vaccine-prevent-
able diseases. Thus these same soldiers may already have
significant preexisting immunity to certain viruses when
the time comes for subsequent deployments—as a re-sult
of prior vaccination during military service, childhood vac-
cination, or even previous infection and recovery. While
epidemiological details may vary based on the virus, this
preexisting immunity is generally highly protective—though
in some cases protection may wane over years or decades.
The presence of preexisting immunity can be determined by
blood tests, and evidence of positive serology is assumed to
be protective against transmission.
In contrast, vaccine-derived immunity can be highly vari-
able. Issues such as cold-chain failure can severely impact vac-
cine efficacy, even to the point of complete lack of protection.
Under reasonable conditions, however, many vaccines (such
as measles and rubella) can confer very high immunity—
nearing 95%, 96%, and even 99% efficacy—though this
immunitymay not be as thorough as that conferred by disease
recovery or implied by the existence of positive serology
for the virus as evidenced by blood tests. Some vaccines
require multiple doses for full protection, and lengthy lags
between immunization and protection can be problematic.
Vaccination in the presence of existing immunity can be
both unnecessary and costly. In addition, for some vaccines,
multiple dosing can result in adverse effects; however, data
on current preexisting immunity is not always available to
medical personnel administering vaccination in a time-frame
compatible with deployment.
If the potential protective benefit of relying on preexisting
immunity to protect deploying troops is significant enough, it
may be feasible to reduce or eliminate mandatory predeploy-
ment vaccination—thus also reducing the potential cost and
risks associated with adverse events resulting from overvac-
cination. But how to evaluate the comparative impacts of the
two types of protection?
From a mathematical perspective, simulating preexisting
immunity and deployment vaccination requires separate
computational approaches. For illustrative purposes, we start
with a basic susceptible-infective-removed (SIR) epidemi-
ological model for the transmission of a generic direct-
transmissible disease and explore the impacts on this model






Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the basic SIR model with inbound
and outbound rotation, casualty, and contact with local populations.
situation, soldiers enter unit 𝑖 of the deployed population via
inbound rotation (𝑏IN) and exit through outbound rotation
(𝑏OUT) or casualty (𝜇); upon deployment individuals enter
the susceptible (𝑆) class and proceed to the infected (𝐼) class
based on the disease transmission rate (𝛽)which is a function
of contacts with other infected soldiers within the same (𝑖)
or different (𝑗) units, or with infected individuals within the
local population (inclocal). Infected soldiers enter the removed
(𝑅) class via recovery (𝛾) and remain there for the duration of




























































Since the deployment rotation for individual soldiers is
assumed to last between 6months and one year (independent
of the duration of the overall deployment action), we make
the simplifying assumption that waning of any preexisting
immunity is negligible over such a brief period. We also
assume that evidence of positive serology implies complete
protection against infection, and thus we can assign the
proportion (protect) of inward rotating troops with preex-
isting immunity “protected” status—that is, these individuals
are now in the removed class—and separate them from the
segment of the deployed population that may participate in
disease transmission. They then retain this protected status
for the duration of their individual deployment rotations.
The remaining (unprotected) deployed population is thus
decreased accordingly so that the risk of transmission among


































































= (protect) 𝑏IN𝑁𝑖 + 𝛾𝐼𝑖 − 𝜇𝑅𝑖 − 𝑏OUT𝑅𝑖.
(2)
For simplicity’s sake, we assume that deployment-associated
vaccination occurs at day zero of deployment. For vaccines
which confer immediate immunity, vaccinated individuals
move directly from the susceptible class to the removed class,
based on the vaccination coverage rate (𝜌) (whichmay be less
than 100%) and the vaccine efficacy (VE) (which may also be




















































= (VE) 𝜌𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾𝐼𝑖 − 𝜇𝑅𝑖 − 𝑏OUT𝑅𝑖.
(3)
For vaccines with a lag prior to protection (such as hepatitis
A) or requiring multiple doses at specific time intervals
(such as hepatitis B), one or more additional holding classes
(𝑉) are required between susceptible and removed classes
with rates reflecting vaccine coverage (𝜌), efficacy (VE), and
duration of lag or time between doses (𝜎). In some situations,
partially-immunized individuals within these holding classes
are protected against disease so long as subsequent doses are
administered on time; however for other vaccines immunity








Figure 3: Schematic diagram of the basic SIR model with vaccina-













Figure 4: Schematic diagram of the basic SIR model with a time lag
between vaccination and protection.
meantime individuals in the holding classes are still fully or





















































































Finally, for “leaky” vaccines—that is, those for which vacci-
nated individuals may still become infected, albeit at lower
rates of susceptibility (𝛿
𝑆
) and with lower resulting infec-
tiousness (𝛿
𝐼
)—(such as varicella), an entire separate level of
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disease classes is required for vaccinated susceptible (𝑆V𝑖) and






















































































− 𝜇𝑆V𝑖 − 𝑏OUT𝑆V𝑖,
𝑑𝐼V𝑖
𝑑𝑡































+ 𝐼V𝑖) − 𝜇𝑅𝑖 − 𝑏OUT𝑅𝑖.
(5)
To evaluate the comparative impacts of preexisting immu-
nity and predeployment vaccination, we look at the pro-

















Figure 5: Schematic diagram of the basic SIR model with vaccina-
tion with a leaky vaccine.
possessing immunity, above which disease transmission is
prevented and below which transmission continues to occur.
Specifically, we are looking for the levels of preexisting
immunity or vaccination coverage rates which result in a
mean annual disease incidence of zero over the duration
of the deployment action. To narrow in on this target, we
simulate preexisting immunity percentages and predeploy-
ment vaccination coverage rates ranging from 0% to 100%.
Because epidemiological conditions vary significantly from
disease to disease, and from vaccine to vaccine, we illustrate
this method by exploring specific case studies of vaccine-
preventable viruses that are known to be endemic in many
regions of the world, and to which deployed populations may
be exposed on a regular basis.
3. Results and Discussion: Case Studies
We evaluate all case study disease models illustrated below
from the perspective of a deployed military population
functioning from a long-standing base, with four types of
units having varying levels of contact with local populations
ranging from high to negligible daily rates of interaction
depending on duty type, based on deployment conditions as
described in published literature [2–7].
Unit-specific levels of contact with local populations are
dependent upon the particular tasks assigned, with some
units, such as support troops, spending only the bare mini-
mum of time off-base; in contrast, other units such as Civil
Affairs and Special Forces may interact with locals on an
almost-daily basis (unpublished data). For this analysis the
deployed population is assumed to consist of one unit of
1,000 soldiers with a high daily probability of contact with the
local population; one unit of 1,000 soldiers with a medium-
to-low daily probability of contact with locals; one unit of
2,000 soldierswith low-to-nodaily probability of contactwith
locals; and one additional unit of 1,000 soldiers, also with
low daily probability of contact with the local population
(Figure 6).
For long-standing bases, troop housing is assumed to be
set up by unit and social mixing is assumed to be “cliquish”
(mainly within-unit), though conditions are very crowded



















Figure 6: Schematic diagram of the basic deployed population
structure and interactions with local populations.
0

















Figure 7: Change in deployed population size over the duration of
deployment.
and so complete isolation of units is impossible. Mixing
within units is assumed to be very homogeneous and high-
level, with each individual within the given unit having daily
contact of some kind with all other individuals of that same
unit.
Long-standing bases are assumed to havewell-established
water purification and food safety systems, with a variety of
on-base dining options, though frequently fresh produce is
brought in from local areas and nearby countries, increasing
the risk of transmission of food-borne illness. We assume
the overall deployment action lasts over a period of ten
years, and individual soldiers have 12-month deployment
rotations. Inbound and outbound rotation rates are assumed
to vary over the deployment action [2–7], allowing the
overall deployed population to expand and contract in size
(Figure 7).
3.1. Measles. Measles is a highly infectious viral disease,
causing symptoms including fever and cough as well as a
blotchy red rash on the face that spreads to become more
generalized. Measles virus is transmitted via droplet spread
or direct contact with infected individuals and is one of
the most highly communicable infectious diseases [8]. The
measles incubation period lasts 7 to 18 days from exposure
and onset of fever, followed by an infectious period of roughly
one week with an attack rate of 3% to 11% in generally
healthy populations [9–11]. Measles mortality rates can range
from 0.2% to 30%, mainly among young and malnourished
children [8]; mortality among healthy adults is negligible.
Live, attenuated measles vaccine is the preferred control
measure, a single dose of which results in significant anti-
body response in 94%–98% of susceptibles [8]. The measles
vaccine is now commonly found in the MMR (measles-
mumps-rubella) combined vaccine, which is recommended
for immunization of all children in the USA at 12–15 months
of age, followed by a second dose at school entry [8]. As of
2012, MMR vaccination coverage among children in the USA
is estimated at approximately 91% [12].
The transmission of measles shows marked annual sea-
sonality, in addition to periodic large epidemics roughly
every two years [13]. Measles infection occurs worldwide,
and though the global average measles vaccination coverage
was estimated at 84% in 2012 [14], many countries and local
regions have coverage rates significantly below this.
Endemic measles transmission was eliminated in the
Americas in 2002 [15]; however importation of measles cases
from other regions continues to occur. A 1980 study of
United States Air Force recruits reported that 22.3% of men
and 17.8% of women recruits were susceptible to measles at
that time [9], and recent seropositivity data from MILVAX
(unpublished) suggest that the level of susceptibility among
US Army recruits is currently approximately 8%–16%.
The mathematical structure for the respiratory transmis-
sion of measles requires the addition of an exposed class to
the basic SIR model, to accommodate the incubation stage
for the disease. Due to single vaccine dosing and absence of
lag prior to protection, vaccinated individuals move directly
from the susceptible class to the removed class based upon
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Table 1: Model parameters for measles transmission model.
Parameter Description Value Source
𝑏IN Inward troop rotation rate
Varies over duration of
deployment [3, 16]
𝑏OUT Outward troop rotation rate




Effective transmission rate within unit 𝑖 Function of attack rate
𝛽
𝑖𝑗
Effective transmission rate between units
𝑖 and 𝑗




Effective transmission rate between unit 𝑖
and local population
Function of attack rate, contact
rate, and local measles incidence
𝜒 Measles attack rate (soldiers) 7% (3%–11%) [17]
𝑐
𝑖
Contact rate with local population for
unit 𝑖 Varies by unit
𝐶
𝑖𝑗 Contact rate between unit 𝑖 and unit 𝑗 Varies by unit
incLOCAL
Measles incidence rate for local
population




Vaccination rate for unit 𝑖 (95% vaccine
efficacy) Scenario-dependent
𝜇 Background casualty rate for all units 0.0007825 1/day [16]
1/𝜀 Duration of measles incubation period 9 days [17]














= (protect) 𝑏IN𝑁𝑖 + (VE) 𝜌𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾𝐼𝑖 − 𝜇𝑅𝑖 − 𝑏OUT𝑅𝑖.
(6)
The measles transmission model was based on previously-
developed work [17] and was calibrated against historical
measles outbreaks for Afghanistan as reported to the World
HealthOrganization [18] under the assumption of fullmixing
between deployed and local populations.
At low levels of protection, computational simulations
of the measles model show that the difference between
preexisting immunity and deployment vaccination, in terms
of mean annual measles incidence, is minor; however this
difference becomes more significant as protection levels
increase (Figure 9).
Measles is known to haveminimum threshold susceptible
population limits, below which transmission will not occur
[19]. Model simulations show that this susceptible population
limit is attained at 66% preexisting immunity or 79% protec-
tion resulting from deployment vaccination. At (and above)
these levels of protection, the total number of susceptible
soldiers is too low for any individual to acquire infection
within the period of deployment—thus defining protective
thresholds for immunity. For this particular setting, when
preexisting immunity among deploying troops meets or
exceeds these thresholds, it is likely that additional deploy-

















































Figure 9: Mean annual measles incidence among deployed pop-
ulations as a function of protection resulting from preexisting
immunity or deployment vaccination.
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3.2. Rubella. Rubella is a mild febrile viral disease, causing
flu-like symptoms as well as a nonraised rash on the face
that spreads to the torso and limbs, which closely represents
the rash resulting from infection with measles or scarlet
fever. As withmeasles, rubella virus is transmitted via droplet
spread or direct contact with infected individuals; however
rubella is significantly less infectious [8, 20, 21]. Rubella
infection in women in their first trimester of pregnancy can
result in congenital rubella syndrome in their unborn infants,
potentially causing significant defects or death of the fetus [8]
(not included in this case study analysis).
A live, attenuated rubella virus vaccine has been available
since 1969, a single dose of which results in significant
antibody response in 95%–99% of susceptibles [8, 20, 22]. As
with measles, the rubella vaccine is commonly found in the
MMR combined vaccine; approximately 90% of children in
the United States had received the rubella vaccine as of 2006
[23].
Though rubella transmission shows higher prevalence
in winter and spring, it is less affected by seasonality than
measles and the magnitude of the seasonal peaks is smaller
[13, 24]. Rubella infection occurs worldwide and is consid-
ered “universally endemic” in most countries [8]. Though
rubella disease is obligatorily reportable to the World Health
Organization (WHO), clinical diagnosis of rubella is often
inaccurate and is frequently mistaken for measles or scarlet
fever—or not diagnosed at all since up to 50% of infections
can present without rash [8]. Laboratory confirmation is
the only reliable evidence of infection. As a result, rubella
incidence as reported to WHO is often significantly lower
than actual levels of infection within the community.
After a universal vaccination campaign in 2004, endemic
rubella transmission was eliminated in the United States;
endemic transmission has also been eliminated in all of
the WHO Region of the Americas [14]; however continuing
transmission in other regions of the world implies that the
US is still at risk of imported cases of rubella, particularly
from areas where rubella vaccination programs have not been
established [25]. The 1980 study of United States Air Force
recruits reported that 18.4% of men and 18.7% of women
recruits were susceptible to rubella at that time [9], and recent
seropositivity data from MILVAX (unpublished) suggest the
level of susceptibility among US Army recruits is currently
approximately 15%–22%.
The mathematical structure for the transmission of
rubella closely parallels that of measles, as both diseases share
common characteristics in terms of their transmission and
vaccination (see Figure 8 and (6)), though specific parameter
values differ (Table 2).
The structure of the rubella transmission model was
based on published models [26, 27] and was qualitatively
calibrated against rubella cases reported to the World Health
Organization during 1999–2011 for Afghanistan, Iran, Pak-
istan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan [28] assum-
ing full mixing between deployed and local populations.
Though rubella is a globally reportable disease, it is important
to stress that the annual rubella case totals reported to




































Figure 10: Mean annual rubella incidence among deployed pop-
ulations as a function of protection resulting from preexisting
immunity or deployment vaccination.
underreporting, asymptomatic infections, and misdiagnosis
of the disease.
Similar to measles, the rubella vaccine has very high
efficacy (95%) with full protection conferred immediately
after immunization. However, unlike measles, there is no
minimum susceptible population limit for rubella. As a result,
we can observe rubella transmission persisting all the way
to 100% protection (Figure 10). At low levels of protection,
computational simulations show that the difference between
preexisting immunity and deployment vaccination, in terms
of mean annual measles incidence, is negligible; this differ-
ence remains minor as protection levels increase, and we find
that no distinct protective thresholds exist to bring rubella
incidence levels to zero within deployed populations for
either type of immunity.
Overall, the simulated mean annual rubella incidence is
low—even for scenarios with no immunity—however rubella
cases do still occur, up to approximately 150 in total during
the 10-year deployment action for no protection whatsoever
(results not shown). In light of the endemic nature of rubella
infection in countries throughout the world, and in combi-
nation with the suboptimal level of preexisting protection
against RUB among American Warfighters, it is likely that
continuing high levels of vaccination coverage in the absence
of elevated preexisting seropositivity is advisable, particularly
in combination with efforts to reduce effective contact rates
with potentially infected local populations. Even in this case,
however, symptomatic and asymptomatic rubella cases will
continue to occur among deployed populations, albeit at very
low levels.
3.3. Varicella. Varicella is a highly contagious disease spread
by direct person-to-person contact and airborne droplet
transmission, characterized by mild fever and a scabbing
rash, thoughmild or asymptomatic infectionsmay occur.The
varicella incubation period lasts two weeks [8, 34], and the
infectious period spans 5–10 days [4, 34, 35], with negligible
mortality, though fever and constitutional manifestations
8 Computational and Mathematical Methods in Medicine
Table 2: Model parameters for rubella transmission model.
Parameter Description Value Source
𝑏IN Inward troop rotation rate [3, 16]
𝑏OUT Outward troop rotation rate [3, 16]
protect Proportion of population protected viaprior seropositivity Scenario-dependent
𝛽
𝑖𝑖
Effective transmission rate within unit 𝑖 Function of attack rate
𝛽
𝑖𝑗
Effective transmission rate between units
𝑖 and 𝑗




Effective transmission rate between unit 𝑖
and local population
Function of attack rate,




Contact rate with local population for
unit 𝑖 Varies by unit
𝐶
𝑖𝑗 Contact rate between unit 𝑖 and unit 𝑗 Varies by unit
𝜒 RUB attack rate (for soldiers) 0.019% (0.019%–8%) [29–32]
incLOCAL RUB incidence rate for local population Varies over time [28, 33]
1/𝜀 Duration of RUB incubation period 12 days (10–21 days) [21, 26, 27]
1/𝛾 Duration of RUB infection period 12.5 days (11–14 days) [20, 26, 27]
𝜇
Casualty rate for all units (nondisease
related) 0.0007825 [16]
𝜌
Vaccination rate for dose 1 (95% vaccine
efficacy) Scenario-dependent
may be severe in adults. Latent manifestation of the varicella
virus can occur in the form of herpes zoster (shingles) and
can result in severe pain and neuralgia (zoster is not included
in this case study analysis).
A live attenuated varicella vaccine has been licensed for
use in the US since 1995, and routine childhood vaccination
is recommended at one year of age with a booster at
school entry [8, 36]. Vaccine efficacy is estimated at 90%
and immediate subsequent immunity is conferred; however
breakthrough infections can occur at a reduced rate, with
milder symptoms and lower infectivity.
Varicella transmission occurs worldwide, with 95% of
individuals in temperate climates experiencing infection by
young adulthood [8]. Recent seropositivity data from MIL-
VAX (unpublished) suggest that the level of existing suscep-
tibility among US Army recruits is currently approximately
3%–8%.
The mathematical structure for the transmission and
vaccination of varicella requires the addition of an exposed
compartment, along with an extra level of disease classes, to

































































































− 𝜇𝑆V𝑖 − 𝑏OUT𝑆V𝑖,
𝑑𝐸V𝑖
𝑑𝑡




















































Figure 11: Schematic diagram of varicella transmission and vaccination.
Table 3: Model parameters for varicella transmission model.
Parameter Description Value Source
𝑏IN Inward troop rotation rate
Varies over duration of
deployment [3, 16]
𝑏OUT Outward troop rotation rate




Effective transmission rate within unit 𝑖 Function of attack rate
𝛽
𝑖𝑗
Effective transmission rate between units
𝑖 and 𝑗




Effective transmission rate between unit 𝑖
and local population
Function of attack rate,




Proportional reduction in varicella
susceptibility after vaccination 97% (50%–100%) [37]
𝛿
𝐼
Proportional reduction in varicella
infectivity after vaccination 50% (20%–100%) [37]
𝜒 Varicella attack rate (soldiers) 50% (30%–90%) [8, 38]
𝑐
𝑖
Contact rate with local population for
unit 𝑖 Varies by unit
𝐶
𝑖𝑗 Contact rate between unit 𝑖 and unit 𝑗 Varies by unit
incLOCAL
Varicella incidence rate for local
population




Vaccination rate for unit 𝑖 (90% vaccine
efficacy) Scenario-dependent
𝜇 Background casualty rate for all units 0.0007825 1/day [16]
1/𝜀 Duration of varicella incubation period 14 days [37]
1/𝛾 Duration of varicella infectious period 7 days [37]
− 𝜀𝐸V𝑖 − 𝜇𝐸V𝑖 − 𝑏OUT𝐸V𝑖,
𝑑𝐼V𝑖
𝑑𝑡




= (protect) 𝑏IN𝑁𝑖 + 𝛾 (𝐼𝑖 + 𝐼V𝑖) − 𝜇𝑅𝑖 − 𝑏OUT𝑅𝑖.
(7)
The structure of the varicella transmission model was based
on published models [37] and was calibrated against pub-
lished historical varicella outbreaks for Romania, Italy, and
Pakistan [38–40] assuming fullmixing between deployed and
local populations.
At lower levels of protection, computational simulations
again show that the difference between preexisting immu-
nity and deployment vaccination, in terms of mean annual
varicella incidence, is minor; however, as with measles, this
difference becomes more significant as protection levels
increase (Figure 12). Protection associated with preexisting
varicella seropositivity is assumed to be immediate, life-long,
and complete, whereas vaccine-derived immunity is both









































Figure 12: Mean annual varicella incidence among deployed pop-
ulations as a function of protection resulting from preexisting
immunity or deployment vaccination.
incomplete and leaky, with a vaccine efficacy of only 90%
and probability of breakthrough infection, even in fully-
immunized individuals; hence the former can be seen to have
a greater impact on incidence particularly as immunity levels
increase.
Even as protection levels approach 100%, varicella cases
continue to occur and we can see that there are no distinct
protective thresholds for the cessation of its transmission
within deployed populations. In light of the aggressive vari-
cella attack rate among susceptible individuals, it is likely that
continuing high levels of vaccination coverage in the absence
of elevated preexisting seropositivity is advisable, perhaps in
combinationwith efforts to reduce effective contact rates with
potentially infected local populations.
3.4. Hepatitis A. Unlikemeasles, rubella, and varicella, trans-
mission of hepatitis A is assumed to be dual-mode: via direct-
or close-contact between susceptible and infected individ-
uals, and via indirect environmental exposure through the
consumption of contaminated food and/or water. Hepatitis
A has an incubation period lasting from two to seven weeks
[8, 41, 42], and an infectious period lasting approximately
three weeks [22, 43]. Once infected, 85% [44] of cases
are assumed to be symptomatic, while the remaining 15%
are asymptomatic and experience lower levels of infectivity.
Hepatitis-associatedmortality is assumed to be extremely low
[8, 45, 46].
Inactivated hepatitis A vaccine has an efficacy of 99% [42,
43, 45, 47]; however there is a 30-day lag period before full
immunity is conferred, during which these newly-vaccinated
individuals may become infected. In the US, hepatitis A
vaccine is recommended for 1-year-old children[48].
Hepatitis A transmission is generally low in developed
countries with good sanitation and hygienic conditions; how-
ever transmission can be very high in developing countries
with poor conditions, and the majority of children in these
regions have been infected with hepatitis A before the age of
10, mostly asymptomatically [49]. In the United States it is
estimated that 33% of the population has evidence of prior
infection [8], and recent seropositivity data from MILVAX
(unpublished) suggest that the level of susceptibility among
US Army recruits is currently approximately 66%–73%.
The mathematical structure for the transmission and
vaccination of hepatitis A requires the inclusion of a sep-
arate input corresponding to the environmental reservoir
for hepatitis A, along with an additional vaccinated class,
to accommodate the lag period between vaccination and
full protection and the potential for continued transmission
































































































= (protect) 𝑏IN𝑁𝑖 + 𝜎𝑉 + 𝛾𝐼𝑖 − 𝜇𝑅𝑖 − 𝑏OUT𝑅𝑖.
(8)
The structure of the hepatitis A transmission model was
based on publishedmodels [41, 50] andwas calibrated against
historical hepatitis A outbreaks for Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and
Palestine as reported in published literature [51–53] assuming
full mixing between deployed and local populations.
As in the previous case studies, computational simu-
lations again show that the difference between preexisting
immunity and deployment vaccination, in terms of mean
annual hepatitis A incidence, becomes more significant as
protection levels increase, with preexisting protection having
a greater impact than deployment vaccination (Figure 14).
In spite of high vaccine efficacy (99%), there is a 30-day
lag after vaccination before full protection is imparted on
immunized soldiers—andwithin this lag period transmission
of hepatitis A resulting from effective contact with infected
individuals or contaminated food is still possible. This long
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Table 4: Model parameters for hepatitis A transmission model.
Parameter Description Value Source
𝑏IN Inward troop rotation rate
Varies over duration of
deployment [3, 16]
𝑏OUT Outward troop rotation rate




Effective transmission rate within unit 𝑖 Function of attack rate
𝛽
𝑖𝑗
Effective transmission rate between units
𝑖 and 𝑗




Effective transmission rate between unit 𝑖
and local population
Function of attack rate,




Effective transmission rate due to
environmental exposure
Function of attack rate,
consumption of local food,
and proportion of local
food that is contaminated
𝑟
Proportion of infections that are
asymptomatic 85% (76%–97%) [44]
𝜃
Proportional reduction in infectivity for
asymptomatic individuals 10% (0%–25%) [44]
𝜒
Hepatitis A attack rate (soldiers) via
direct transmission 0.82% (0.82%–1.3%) [44]
𝜒
𝑊
Hepatitis A attack rate (soldiers) via
environmental consumption 2.2% (2.2%–3.5%) [44]
𝑐
𝑖
Contact rate with local population for
unit 𝑖 Varies by unit
𝐶
𝑖𝑗 Contact rate between unit 𝑖 and unit 𝑗 Varies by unit
𝑐
𝑖𝑊
Contact rate with environmental
reservoir Varies by unit
incLOCAL
Hepatitis A incidence rate for local
population




Vaccination rate for unit 𝑖 (90% vaccine
efficacy) Scenario-dependent
1/𝜓
Duration of lag prior to full
vaccine-induced immunity 30 days [44]
𝜇 Background casualty rate for all units 0.0007825 1/day [16]
𝜇
𝐻
Hepatitis A case fatality rate 0.3% (0.1%–0.8%) [8, 45, 46]
1/𝜀 Duration of hepatitis A incubation period 14 days [41, 42]
1/𝛾 Duration of hepatitis A infectious period 21 days [42, 54]
𝑊
Proportion of local food that is


















Figure 13: Schematic diagram of hepatitis A transmission and vaccination.






































Figure 14: Mean annual hepatitis A incidence among deployed
populations as a function of protection resulting from preexisting
immunity or deployment vaccination.
delay dramatically reduces the effectiveness of vaccination at
the beginning of deployment.
For hepatitis A, again model simulations indicate that
there is no protective threshold which prevents disease
transmission. Even 100% vaccination coverage prevents only
85%–90% of simulated hepatitis A incidence (results not
shown), due to the lengthy time-lag between vaccination
and full protection. Sensitivity analyses (results not shown)
indicate that exposure to contaminated food sources is a
higher risk factor for hepatitis-A transmission than contact
with infected individuals; thus any efforts to reduce this expo-
sure could significantly decrease disease incidence among
deployed troops. Also, although vaccination provides less
protection against hepatitis A transmission among deployed
populations than does preexisting seropositivity, it is likely
that immunizing troops with hepatitis A vaccine at least
30 days prior to deployment may improve this protection
by eliminating (or drastically reducing) the possibility of
exposure to contamination during the efficacy lag period.
3.5. Hepatitis B. Hepatitis B is the most serious type of viral
hepatitis, causing potentially life-threatening liver infection,
chronic liver disease, and risk of death due to cirrhosis of
the liver and liver cancer. Hepatitis B is transmitted by direct
contact with blood or other bodily fluids of infected individu-
als, similar to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), though
with dramatically greater infectivity. UnlikeHIV, the hepatitis
B virus can survive outside the body for at least 7 days. During
this time, the virus can still cause infection if it enters the body
of a person who is not protected by the vaccine or immunity
resulting from recovery from prior infection. Hepatitis B is
not spread by contaminated food or water and cannot be
spread by casual contact.
50%–90% of patients with acute hepatitis B infection
experience subclinical illness that may remain undetected;
the remaining acute patients develop symptoms that can
include fever, fatigue, anorexia, nausea, body aches, jaundice,
and (rarely) acute liver failure [8], which can progress to
chronic infection at a rate dependent upon the age at infec-
tion. Most individuals who are infected as adults will develop
acute hepatitis and be able to clear the disease; approximately
1–10% of individuals newly-infected as adults will develop
chronic hepatitis [55, 56].
A vaccine against hepatitis B has been available since
1982, which is 95-96% effective in preventing infection while
conferring long-term (possibly lifelong) immunity [8, 57–
59]. The vaccination series for newborns consists of 3 doses:
birth, 1-2 months of age, and 6–18 months of age; the
dosing schedule for unvaccinated adults also includes 3
doses, with the second given 4 weeks after the first and
the third 3–5 months after the second [57]. As of 2001,
childhood vaccination coverage in the USwith all three doses
averaged 88%-89% [60], and 2010 coverage among adults
was estimated at 42% [61]. Recent seropositivity data from
MILVAX (unpublished) suggest that the level of susceptibility
among US Army recruits is currently approximately 41–55%.
Prevalence and incidence rates of hepatitis B vary with
location as well as cultural behaviors, though seasonal pat-
terns of transmission are absent [62]. In Western Europe
and North America it is estimated that less than 1% of the
population is chronically infected with hepatitis B [8, 56].
In the United States prevalence is significantly higher for
those with military background [61] due to risk factors such
as communal living conditions and exposure in developing
countries where viral hepatitis is endemic [63]. In combat
deployments, additional risk results from the use of fresh
whole blood transfusion when demands for massive trans-
fusions outstrip existing supplies [64]. This is of particular
relevance when immunization against hepatitis B is less than
optimal and exposure to the virus has already occurred
during the deployment, as the incubation period can be
on the order of months and the majority of infections are
subclinical [8].
The mathematical structure for the transmission of hep-
atitis B requires that the infected class be split into acute
and chronic compartments to accommodate the separate
epidemiological characteristics. The model also requires the
addition of three distinct holding compartments representing
the separate doses required for immunity, starting with dose
1 at the time of deployment (Figure 15, (9), Table 5). In the
absence of clinical data along these lines, we assume within
the model that partially immunized individuals are protected

































































































































































































= 𝑏IN𝑁𝑖 − 𝜇𝐴𝐼𝐴𝑖 − 𝜇𝑁𝑖 − 𝑏OUT𝑁𝑖.
(9)
The structure of the hepatitis B transmission model was
based on published models [65]. Local HBV prevalence in









































Figure 16: Mean annual hepatitis B incidence among deployed
populations as a function of protection resulting from preexisting
immunity or deployment vaccination.
within Middle Eastern countries with moderate vaccina-
tion coverage (68–90%) and intermediate endemicity and
countries with lower vaccination coverage (under 68%) and
higher endemicity [66], as well as global regions with mixed
transmission modes and intermediate carrier rates [67].
As with the previous case studies, computational simu-
lations again show that the difference between preexisting
immunity and deployment vaccination, in terms of mean
annual hepatitis B incidence, becomes more significant as
protection levels increase, with preexisting protection having
a greater impact than deployment vaccination (Figure 16).
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Table 5: Model parameters for hepatitis B transmission model.
Parameter Description Value Source
𝑏IN Inward troop rotation rate [3, 16]
𝑏OUT Outward troop rotation rate [3, 16]
𝛽
𝑖𝑖
Effective transmission rate within unit 𝑖 Function of attack rate
𝛽
𝑖𝑗 Effective transmission rate between units 𝑖 and 𝑗 Function of attack and contact rates
𝛽
𝑖LOCAL
Effective transmission rate between unit 𝑖 and local
population
Function of attack rate, contact rate,
and local HBV prevalence
𝑐
𝑖
Contact rate with local population for unit 𝑖 Varies by unit
𝐶
𝑖𝑗 Contact rate between unit 𝑖 and unit 𝑗 Varies by unit
𝜒 HBV attack rate (for soldiers) 25% (11%–71%) [68–71]
incLOCAL HBV prevalence rate for local population 5% [18, 66, 67]
1/𝜀 Duration of HBV incubation period 90 days (60–90 days) [57]
1/𝛾
𝐴
Duration of HBV acute infection period 28 days (23–28 days) [72]
1/𝛾
𝑐
Duration of HBV chronic infection period 40 years (lifelong) Calibrated
𝜓 Conversion rate from acute to chronic HBV infection 5% (2%–90%) [65]
𝜇 Casualty rate for all units (nondisease related) 0.0007825 [16]
𝜇
𝐴




















status prior to third dose vaccination 150 days [57]
For hepatitis B, simulations show that no distinct protec-
tive thresholds exist for the cessation of transmission within
deployed populations for either type of immunity. Though
three doses of vaccine are required for lasting immunity,
partially immunized individuals are assumed to be protected
at the full vaccine efficacy so long as subsequent doses are
administered on schedule; thus the difference between the
two types of immunity is most likely a result of the 4% of
vaccinated individuals failing to receive protection due to
imperfect vaccine efficacy (we assume that soldiers return to
the base medical facility on time to receive all doses).
Protection associated with preexisting hepatitis B sero-
positivity resulting from previous vaccination or recovery
from infection is assumed to be immediate, life-long, and
complete, whereas vaccine-derived immunity is both incom-
plete and lengthy to acquire, with a vaccine efficacy of
only 96% and a total of six months to complete the entire
three-dose vaccine course. In light of the persistent level of
chronic carriers worldwide, and in combination with the
onlymoderate level of preexisting protection against hepatitis
B currently among American Warfighters, it is likely that
continuing high levels of vaccination coverage in the absence
of elevated preexisting seropositivity is advisable, particularly
in combination with efforts to reduce effective contact rates
with potentially infected local populations. Even in this case,
however, hepatitis B cases could continue to occur among
deployed populations, particularly if partially immunized
individuals do not experience full protection between doses.
4. Conclusions: Limitations and Next Steps
All models are abstractions of reality and as such involve
necessary simplifications in order to produce a numerical
model which can be simulated. Deterministic models, in
particular—as in the case studies above—can obscure trans-
mission dynamics at extremely low incidence levels implying
that protective thresholds may possibly occur at lower levels
of preexisting immunity or deployment vaccination. Also the
case study population structure assumes homogeneity within
subgroups, which can be inappropriate for populations struc-
tured with a high degree of segregation between groups, par-
ticularly in terms of implementing highly focused outbreak
responses. However, depending on deployed conditions, this
may not be an issue for the case study populations as within-
unit mixing is assumed to occur within relatively confined
areas and may closely approximate homogeneity. Finally,
parameter values implemented during analyses were derived
from a variety of data sources, some of whichmay not be rep-
resentative of populations directly compatible with deployed
USmilitary populations. Sensitivity and uncertainty analyses
performed during the case studies (results not shown) have
explored these issues for the specific diseases and settings
described above.
There has also been some indication that detection of pre-
existing seropositivity to a virus may not be equivalent to full
protection against transmission (see, e.g., [73]). Reduction
or lack of protection in individuals with prior serology for a
virus could dramatically affect model predictions in terms of
the relative benefits of deployment vaccination.
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However the exploration of the protective threshold, even
in the presence ofmodel limitations, can still provide valuable
insight into the best way in which to protect deploying troops
from transmission of vaccine-preventable disease. Building
upon these results, we can now incorporate additional
aspects unique to this setting—such as the risk of adverse
events resulting from the administration of multiple vaccine
doses, delay in implementation of full vaccine course, or
reduced vaccine efficacy due to harsh field conditions—along
with cost calculations to further expand the comparison
between preexisting immunity and vaccination at the time
of deployment as a means of preventing outbreaks and
protecting troops and mission objectives during extended
military deployment actions.
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